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The Right to Education
as an International Human Right
By Jost Delbriick

The classical notion of human rights is clearly associated with the idea of
individual freedom; freedom from interference with or violation of basic rights of
citizens at the hands of governments, legislatures, or even judiciaries neglecting the
constitutional or other wholesome restraints of the law. In a rather belated
response of 20th century society to the so-called social question posed in the 19th
century by the miserable plight of the toiling masses in a rapidly industrializing
world, a "second generation" of human rights was developed: economic, social and
cultural rights. The right to work, the right to at least a minimum standard of
social security and, last but not least, the right to education have been included in
national and international constitutional or other legal documents ever since.
The major difference between the classical liberal human rights and the new type
of human rights is generally seen to consist in a reversal of their role and function in
the relationship between citizens and State or government. While classical human
rights aimed at keeping State authority out of the individual's private sphere of
action and personal development - a human rights philosophy pointedly articulated in the classical notion of "rhe right to be let alone" 1 - the new human rights
aim at getting the State or government "involved", i. e. obliging the State or
government to provide services to the people. Governments are now seen to be
under an obligation to act in order to implement such human rights as the right to
work or the right to education. The literally omnipresent modern welfare State is a
direct product of this new human rights philosophy. This philosophy has almost
universally taken deep roots in people's minds because of its humanistic and social
dimensions, and because it clearly addresses major concerns and needs of people
world-wide.
However, from the beginning the "new generation" of human rights has also met
with considerable opposition. In many quarters these rights were associated with
"Socialism" - seemingly in and of itself a reproach not in need of more substantive
argument. On a more profound level of argument, opposition to the "new rights"
J.Braxton Craven,Jr.,Personhood: The Right to Be Let Alone, in: Duke Law Journal,
Summer 1976, 699.
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was and is based on the contention that they are incompatible with the concept of a
free, market-oriented social order, The most serious allegation against the "new
rights", however, is based on the concern or fear that the necessarily strong State
involvement in the process of implementing the "new rights" might threaten
individual freedom and might undermine the very foundations of a free society
altogether. Thus, the introduction of the "new rights" into national constitutions
or international human rights stipulations is rejected al limine - following the
principiisobsta principle.
This article attempts to probe into the validity of the arguments raised against
the "new rights". It will focus on the right to education - understood as the right
to receive an education, not as the right (e. g.of parents) to educate - and will try
to shed some light on the full meaning of the right to education. In particular, it
shall be discussed whether or not it is true that the right to education is, in fact, a
right which can be so clearly distinguished from the classical liberal human rights as
critics contend. In other words, the question to be asked is whether the right to
education is aimed solely at an increased State "involvement" with all the inherent
dangers for a free society, or whether the right to education is also inherently
linked to the classical human rights notion of individual freedom, and if so, which
conclusions can be drawn from this wider understanding of the right to education
for the ways and means through which such a right should be implemented.
The article will be developed in three stages. In Part I, the anthropological and
philosophical foundations of the right to education as they are perceived in
modern societies will be summarized, and the place of this right in positive national
and international law will be sketched out. In Part II, the meaning of the right to
education according to its positive enactment in the law will be looked into, taking
note of the various kinds and forms of education as well as the aims pursued in
education. Particular interest will be taken in the role of the State as it is envisaged
by the authors of the right in various legal documents, and the role of parents and
non-governmental institutions involved in education. In a final section, Part III,
the concept of the right of education, its role and function for the individual and
vis-a'-vis the State will be outlined.

I. The Anthropological and Philosophical Foundations
of the Right to Education and its Codification in Positive Law
1. The process of growth of a human being - as that of any other living being is determined biologically. But unlike other living beings, during infancy and after
- until reaching maturity - a human being is dependent on the care of parents
and/or other persons and institutions. There is no other way of decreasing and
ultimately overcoming such dependence than developing in children the skills
necessary to gradually enable each child to take care of him- or herself. In other
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words, education of the human being from the day of birth is an indispensable
prerequisite for survival and growing up. But the notion of education is not
confined to the more or less "technical" aspects of learning skills of survival. The
Term "education" has a wider meaning, i. e. the intellectual, spiritual, and emotional development of the human being, of his or her intellectual, spiritual, and
emotional potential. This meaning is expressed in both German and French in the
separate terms "Bildung" - "Ausbildung" and "culture generale" - "'ducation/
instruction", respectively.2 From ancient times historical accounts of human
development are replete with descriptions of how the task of education was
discharged, by whom and toward what ultimate aims. The fascinating history of
the unfolding of the concept of education cannot even be summarized here.3
Suffice it to say that education has always been characterized by the two major
concerns of cultures and peoples, namely to transmit to the young the technical
skills necessary to master the tasks of daily life as well as the religious (philosophical), cultural and social values of the respective societies, peoples, and the
subgroups thereof.
The modern debate in the Western hemisphere on how to educate and to what
ends started in the wake of the break-down of the medieval ordo. This entailed the
emancipation of the individual from the tutelage of the Church and from secular,
feudal bonds; a process which culminated in the age of Enlightenment. As a result,
education, its modes and ends, increasingly became the object of critical philosophical and also political reflection. Under the impact of these developments
traditional educational structures and institutions of socialization broke down,
but new uncontested concepts or "philosophies" of education did not (and could
not) replace the traditional concepts. Education was discovered as constituting a
concept related to the needs, convictions, and political, cultural and social
perceptions of the times. The emergence of a science of education is symptomatic
of this new understanding of the notion of education, and the abundant, rather
disparate literature on the subject is indicative of the "educational paradise lost".4
However, in recent decades it seems that despite the diversity of educational
"philosophies" and aims, modern societies have in a way returned to the undisputable fact that the human being does not only need to be familiarized with the skills
indispensable in a modern civilized society. Rather, it seems to be widely recognized that education in a broader sense, in the sense of "Bildung", is a prerequisite
for the human being to understand the world around and to find his or her identity
as a human being endowed with a distinct personalityand dignity.' All diversity or
2 Brockhaus Enzyklopidie in 20 Binden, vol. 5, Wiesbaden 1968, 707 (entry: "Erziehung").
I For a concise survey of the development of the concept of education see Ernst
Lichtenstein, entry "Bildung", in: Joachim Ritter (ed.), Historisches W6rterbuch der
Philosophie, vol. 1, Darmstadt 1971, col. 921 et seq.
4 Lichtenstein, op. cit., col. 931 et seq.
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even controversy over the "true" educational ways and ends notwithstanding,
there seems to be a growing consensus that education must enable the human being
to live a responsible life within society, to participate in communal life, and to
develop his or her personality and identity, ideas inherent in the notion of human
dignity. How this concept of education has found its way into the written law of
today - national and international - and to what extent, has to be the next step
of inquiry.
2. Throughout much of history, education was a matter of concern for the
family, religious institutions, and secular corporate entities such as guilds and
similar groupings. With the increasing emancipation of the individual and the
gradual realization that education was a matter of public concern for the emerging
modern State, a significant shift from the traditional social agents of education to
the State took place. Simultaneously, this meant that education took on a legal
dimension, that is to say, education as a public responsibility of the State
necessitated the regulation of some vital issues by law. The hitherto almost
unchallenged determining role of the parents in the education of their children had
to be restricted and marked off vis-a-vis the role of the State; the question had to be
answered as to whether or not every child had to submit to schooling, i. e. public or
private education, and for how long; and last but not least the question had to be
settled as to how religious education was to be handled - outside the schools or
inside (or both), by the Church (or the respective churches) or by parents and
school teachers.
In the 18th century school attendance was made mandatory. In Germany, the
State of Prussia introduced mandatory school attendance in 1717 and in 1794 the
Prussian General Code of Law (Allgemeines Landrecht) declared schools which
until then had been the responsibility of the churches, foundations or city
governments, to be State institutions. More or less similar developments took
place in other European States and abroad. Thus, one may say that by the end of
the 19th and early 20th century, the obligationon the part of parents and children
to secure some kind of at least basic education for children was established, in
principle, by law. Reality, however, was a different matter. In the highly stratified
pre-World War I societies - despite mandatory school attendance - education to
a large degree remained a privilege of the upper strata of society, of the so-called
"Bildungsbiirgertum" (the educated bourgeoisie).
I In this context compare Kant's statement: "Der Mensch kann nur Mensch werden
durch Erziehung. Er ist nichts, als was Erziehung aus ihm macht". Immanuel Kant, Ober
Pidagogik, in: Wilhelm Weischede (ed.), Werkausgabe, vol. XII, 1977, 699; and Petalozzi's
observation: "Wer nicht Mensch ist, in seinen innern Kriften ausgebildeter Mensch ist, dem
fehlt die Grundlage zur Bildung seiner n~ihern Bestimmung und seiner besonderen Lage,
welchen Mangel keine iiufere H6he entschuldigt". Johann Heinrich Pestalozzi, Abendstunde eines Einsiedlers, Simtliche Werke, Arthur Buchenauer / Eduard Spranger / Hans
Stettbacher (eds.), vol. 1, Frankfurt 1927, 270.
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The injustice of the prevailing distribution of educational opportunities led to
another almost revolutionary change of perspectives with regard to education: the
emphasis on mandatory school attendance rapidly was shifted to the demand for
equal access to education which was increasingly perceived as the key to social
advancement. The spread of democratic ideas, particularly the right to equality
under and through the law, contributed to the gradual development of the notion
of a basic or human right to education. During the inter-war period between 1919
and 1939 a considerable number of national constitutions, particularly those of
States either just established or having changed to democratic government,
included the right to education alongside the rights of parents with regard to the
education of their children, and a definition of the State responsibilities in the field
of education. 6 Other countries - while not adhering to the notion of a right to
education - opened their secondary and tertiary educational institutions to
society at large in an effort to provide equal opportunity through education for all,
an effort which gained another moral dimension when the provision of equal
educational opportunities was no longer a matter of eliminating privileges based
on class but on race. The development of this idea in the United States, particularly after the landmark decision of Brown v. Board of Educationof Topeka (1954), is
a telling example in point. The right to education has also gained considerable
importance with regard to the elimination of discrimination against women in
education.
It was not, however, until after the end of World War II that the right to
education was also recognized in international law. When the United Nations
General Assembly in 1948 solemnly recognized that the protection of human
rights had become an international responsibility, and to that end adopted the
Universal Declaration of Human Rights on 10 December 19488 it included a
number of "second generation" rights in the document. Amongst these was the
right to education in Article 26. Although the Universal Declaration is a resolution
passed by the General Assembly and as such does not have the binding force of law,
it is worthwhile to quote Article 26 in full, as it spells out the whole range of issues
6 The earliest German constitutional codification of this kind was introduced into the
Paulskirchenverfassung of 1849, which, however, did not enter into force: "Das Unterrichtsund Erziehungswesen steht unter der Oberaufsicht des Staates, und ist, abgesehen vom
Religionsunterricht, der Beaufsichtigung der Geistlichkeit als solcher enthoben." (S153).
"FUr die Bildung der deutschen Jugend soil durch 6ffentliche Schulen iiberall geniigend
gesorgt werden." (S155) - Similar, even more detailed provisions were contained in the
Weimar Constitution of 1919 (arts. 144, 147 and 149) which were taken as the basis for the
present provision of art. 7 of the German Basic Law and the constitutions of the German
Linder after the end of World War II.
7 347 U.S. 483 (1954) - 1st Brown decision; 349 U.S. 249 (1955) - 2nd Brown decision.
8 UN GA res. 217 A (III), text reprinted in: Louis B. Sohn / Thomas Buergenthal(eds.),
Basic Documents on International Protection of Human Rights, Indianapolis/Kansas City/
New York 1973, 30 et seq.
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discussed in the national and international debates on the proper place and role of
education in the constitutional and social fabric of modern society:
(1) Everyone has the right to education. Education shall be free, at least in the
elementary and fundamental stages. Elementary education shall be compulsory. Technical and professional education shall be made generally available and higher education
shall be made accessible to all on the basis of merit.
(2) Education shall be directed to the full development of the human personality and to
strengthening of respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms. It shall promote
understanding, tolerance and friendship among all nations, racial or religious groups,
and shall further the activities of the United Nations for the maintenance of peace.
(3) Parents have a prior right to choose the kind of education that shall be given to their
children. 9
This first solemn international commitment to the recognition of the right to
education was further elaborated and refined and ultimately included into the UN
Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights of 1966 which entered into
force in 1976 and in 1990 had been ratified by more than 90 States. 10 In the present
context it is important to note that the educational goals - set out in paragraph 2
of Article 26 of the Universal Declaration - were now included in paragraph 1 of
Article 13 of the Covenant and significantly amended. The sentence now reads:
"[The States Parties] agree that education shall be directed to the full development
of the human personality and the sense of its dignity"."I Furthermore, Article 13,
paragraph 1, is more specific with regard to the operative ends of education, i. e.
that "education shall enable all persons to participateeffectively in a free society,
promote understanding, tolerance and friendship among all nations". 12 State
responsibilities in the provision of educational opportunities are also spelled out
more specifically. The rights of parents to have their say in the education of their
children are more clearly defined and the existence of private schools alongside
public schools is expressly guaranteed. The authority of the State to maintain a
minimum standard of educational quality with regard to private schools is also
recognized.
The right to education has also been recognized with the force of law in other
universal human rights treaties specifically dealing with the elimination of discrimination based on race, sex or religion. Thus Article 5 d (v) of the Convention on the
Elimination of all Forms of Racial Discrimination of 196613 and the UNESCO
Convention Against Discrimination in Education of 1960 provide for the international protection of the right to education. The right of parents to freely
9Op. cit.

'0United Nations Treaty Seriens (UNTS), vol. 993, 3 et seq.; text reprinted in: Sohn /
Buergenthal (note 8), 35 et seq.
n Id.
12Id., emphasis added.
13 UNTS, vol. 660, no. 9564.

7 GYIL 35

Jost Delbriick

determine "the religious and moral education of their children in conformity with
their own convictions" is once again guaranteed in the UN Covenant on Civil and
Political Rights of 1966.14 The most recent codification of the right to education is
contained in the Convention on the Rights of the Child of 19891s which, however,
has not yet entered into force.
On the regional level the right to education has found its way into the 1952
Protocol [No. 1] to the European Convention for the Protection of Human
Rights and Fundamental Freedoms of 1950 (Article 2),16 the Charter of the
Organization of American States (Article 47), 11 the American Convention on
Human Rights of 1969 (Article 12, paragraph 4, and Article 26), is and the Banjul
(African) Charter of Human Rights and Rights of Peoples of 1982 (Article 17). 19
The list of positive, legally binding guarantees of the right to education is
impressive indeed. What the exact meaning and scope of this right is and whether
or not the fears and dangers associated with the concept of the "new rights" are
valid have now to be discussed in turn.
II. The Meaning and Scope of the Right to Education
1. The focal point and ultimate basis of the right to education as embodied in
the various national and international constitutional or other legal instruments is
the unequivocal commitment to the dignity inherent in every human being and
hence to the development of the human personality. The Universal Declaration of
Human Rights and the UN Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights
expressly emphasize this point in the very articles dealing with the right to
education. Other instruments like the European Human Rights Convention make
only indirect reference to human dignity as the anchor point for the right to
education, i. e.by reference to the Universal Declaration of Human Rights which
the Council of Europe intended to implement by the adoption of the European
Convention. Human dignity thus not only forms the basis of the right to
education but also gives the right a normative dimension beyond the force of
positive law. This interpretation finds ample support in the practice of the UN
General Assembly. In its numerous pronouncements on the right to education it
time and again emphasized the "paramount importance of the implementation of
14UNTS, vol. 999, 171 et seq.
Is UN Doc. E/CN.4/1989/29/Rev.1.
16

UNTS, vol. 213, 221 et seq.; (ECHR); European Treaty Series No. 9 (Protocol).

l UNTS, vol. 119, 3 et seq.; vol. 721, 324 et seq.

Organization of American States (OAS), Official Records OEA/Ser.K/XVI/I.I, Doc.
65, Rev. 1, Corr. 2.
1'International Legal Materials, vol. 21, 1982, 59 et seq.
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the right to education for the full development of human personality and for the
enjoyment of other fundamental international human rights and freedoms".20
The General Conference of UNESCO also adopted a number of important
resolutions which elaborated on questions of vocational and professional education. The most important UNESCO resolution on the subject was, however, the
"Recommendation sur Ie'ducation pour la comprehension, la cooperation et la
paix internationale et l' ducation relative aux droits de l'homme et aux libertes
fondamentales" of 197421 which highlighted UNESCO's perception of an integrated notion of education (general and vocational/professional) as the basis of the
full development of the human personality. Therefore, it can be safely concluded
that the human personality inherent in human dignity forms the basis of all aspects
and implications of the right to education and as such has to be taken into account
in determining the meaning and scope of the right, especially with regard to the
role of the State in the process of implementing the right to education.
2. The right to education as codified in the legal instruments referred to above
clearly distinguishes between education as the provision of basic skills - general
and specific vocational and professional - and education as the broader development of the personality of the young. The role of the State in the provision of the
former kind of education is strongly emphasized in all the codifications named and
in respective domestic constitutional documents as well. Basic or fundamental
education in elementary schools and in vocational or professional training is to be
provided by the State authorities in public institutions although private schools
are not ruled out. But here again the State authorities are vested with rather
extensive supervisory powers. Furthermore, this kind of education is to be open
and free for all. This means that the provision of education is not only perceived of
as a responsibilty of the State in terms of substance, i. e. in terms of the upholding
of certain quality standards, but in terms of a financial responsibility, as well, which
certainly adds to the strong role that the State is to play in the field of education.
The obligation to provide for free education according to some of the codifications
of the right to education is to be gradually extended to the field of higher education
as well. Thus the strong role of the State is also to come to bear on this level.
Interestingly, the proviso of Article 26 of the Universal Declaration which stated
that higher education is to be accessible to all "on the basis of merit" has not been
carried over to the Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights. Broad
access to institutions of higher education as part of the right to education evidently
is considered to have priority over the individual intellectual capabilities.

GA res. 34/170 of 17 December 1979.
see VladimirKartashkin,Les droits &onomiques, sociaux et
culturels, in: Karel Vasak (ed.), Les dimensions internationales des droits de l'homme, Paris
1978, 123 et seq.
20

21 On this recommendation
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This is not surprising given the fact that a large number of States participating in
the drafting of the Covenant were certainly more concerned with combating
illiteracy and strengthening the general level of education - a prerequisite for the
economic and social advancement of their respective countries - than with
individual educational aspirations.2 2Under this perspective, the right to education
shows a more instrumental character than one would accord to it from the point of
view of a broader concept of education in the sense of building a well-rounded
personality in the tradition of the liberal arts or humanistic educational ideals.
This aspect of education is, however, not altogether neglected by the respective
codifications of the right to education.
As the text of Article 26 of the Universal Declaration and Article 13 of the UN
Covenant of Economic, Social and Cultural Rights show, the education to which
every human person is entitled shall lead to the full development of the human
personality, tolerance, respect for human rights and for other racial, ethnic or
religious groups. Although this may not be a comprehensive catalogue of educational goals, this enumeration of educational goals certainly points beyond the
narrower understanding of education instrumental to the economic and social
advancement of particular societies. But it is also quite evident that the respective
international legal enactments of the right to education are much less specific with
regard to these overall goals than they are with regard to the implementation of the
right to education on the elementary and secondary levels. Particularly, one would
be hard put to find any express reference to the value of a broad education with
regard to the exercise of individualfreedom as the basisof a socially responsiblelife
in a free society. To be sure, the phrase in Article 13 of the UN Covenant on
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights that "education shall enable all persons to
participate effectively in a free society" comes close to this fundamental aspect of
education. But the phrase still seems to have a certain "instrumental" ring in that it
speaks of "effective" participation in a free society, and it does not refer to the
individual as the focal subject, but rather to collectivities like "all persons" and
"society". From this perspective, it looks as if the right to education is to be
interpreted solely in terms of a social right which corresponds with an obligation of
the State to provide for educational opportunities and - in exercising this right subjects the child to mandatory education (at least at the elementary level). But
this may not be the final word on the matter. The question to be asked is whether it
can be established that the right to education is also linked to the protection of
individual freedom, i. e. the classical human rights concept, as it may be seen to be
suggested by the reference of the human rights instrument analyzed here to the
goals of personal development, tolerance and respect for human rights. This
problem is addressed in the following section.
22 The relevance and importance of education for the less developed countries is a
pervading theme in the various resolutions adopted by the United Nations and UNESCO,
see, e.g., reference in note 20 above.
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3. In order to answer the question as to whether the right to education is solely
to be interpreted as a right to demand from the State the provision of adequate
educational opportunities, or whether the right could also be understood as a right
protectingspecific aspects of individual freedom, as a first step, one has to consider
more closely the implications of the preceding findings with regard to the right to
education. The right to education has been found to mean that everybody is
entitled to access to educational facilities and to a quantitatively and qualitatively
adequate education. This entails an obligation on the part of the State to provide
the necessary financial resources for schools and other learning institutions.
Furthermore, the State is under an obligation not only to supervise private schools
with regard to their qualitative performance but also public schools and institutions. This supervisory function, in turn, enables the State to exercise active
influence on the curricula, and governmental practice shows that this function is
extensively used by the public authorities time and again. Educational goals are
defined in State laws, school books are selected by the government authorities (or
at least must be approved by them) and in many cases - even in pluralistic,
democratic societies - governments attempt to promote the teaching of a
particular ideology or "Weltanschauung", a phenomenon that cannot be overlooked. These often successful attempts usually are the outcome of considerable
political pressure from various ideological groups or segments of the societies
concerned. Even the Universal Declaration of Human Rights is not free of the
temptation to link the right to education to a specific political goal, i. e. to "further
the activities of the United Nations and the maintenance of peace" (Article 26,
paragraph 2). Although none of these goals may be objectionable the phrasing of
Article 26 supports the view taken here, that the right to education, once made
operative, entails wide possibilities of State control over the educational system in
terms of its organizational structures, goals and the curricula. Seen from this angle,
the right to education, indeed seems to form a typical "new" or "second generation" (social) right demanding State "involvement", and not a right to protect the
individual from State interferences. But there is another side to the picture.
First of all, it may be mentioned here that the right to education in the Protocol
[1] to the European Convention on Human Rights - quite differently from the
other codifications - is couched in negative terms: "No person shall be denied the
right to education" (Article 2 - emphasis added). It is to be granted that this
formula presupposes the existence of a - most likely - State supported educational infrastructure. But the right is conceived in a way that the protection of the
right to education is emphasized. It shall not be infringed by any governmental
authority. This is the philosophy of the classical human rights concept. This
different approach to the formulation of the right to education, limited to the
(Western) European context as it is, must not be overestimated in its significance.
It still indicates that the right to education must not necessarily be merely
conceived of as right to State "involvement". The example of Article 2 of Protocol
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[1] of the European Convention gives a first indication that there may be, indeed, a
dimension of individual freedom to the right to education. And a closer look into
the international instruments analyzed here reveals that there are other indications
for the existence of this dimension of individual freedom of the right to education.
These are, for one, to be found in the guarantee of the rights of parents to ensure
that their children are instructed in "conformity with the religious and philosophical convictions" of the parents - a guarantee contained in almost all of the
international and regional human rights instruments.23 This guarantee constitutes
a strong barrier against forcible State indoctrination - a precondition for the
preservation of individual freedom also in the field of education. It has to be
recognized, however, that this guarantee protecting the young from undue indoctrination and thereby his or her individual freedom, does not directly pertain to the
young person protected. It is a right of the parents which only operates in favor of
the young person. The question is whether one could even find a basis for the
interpretation of the right to education so that it belongs directly to the young
individual him- or herself, which would prove that this right itself has a dimension
of individual freedom to be protected against State infringement.
Such an interpretation is indeed possible. It has been shown above that the right
to education is ultimately based on the belief in the value of the human personality
and in the inherent dignity of every human being. The unfolding and development
of these qualities - although inseparable from the social and educational setting
and depending on intense communication with the communal environment - is
ultimately an individual process of the human being. If education is to enable a
person to truly understand the world around, to exercise tolerance and to live a
responsible life in community with others, and all this based on well-reasoned
individual decisions, no governmental authority charged with whatever responsibilities in the field of education may force particular ideas or value judgments upon
the individual persons educated. They have to be introduced to the world of ideas,
conflicting values and social concepts, but only with the aim of enabling them to
make up their own minds, to develop a critical and open personal stand towards the
subjects laid before them. But the right to fend off direct State indoctrination in
education, as it is sketched out here, does not cover the whole problem of the
protection of individual freedom in education.
Even if State authorities in the field of education are kept within the bounds of
the right to education understood as a right also to secure individual freedom, this
individual right to be free from undue or false indoctrination is not beyond the
danger of actual or potential violations. For it has to be recognized that educators
themselves may hold strong views and may be committed to particular philosophi-

cal, religious or political concepts. They may be - and quite often are - tempted
to force these ideas upon their students. But educators everywhere have to live up
23

To my knowledge, only the African Charter does not contain such a clause.
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to the same open and critical educational approach as State authorities themselves.
Thus, if the right to education is to have any meaningful function in the protection
of individual freedom in education, it also has to work as a barrier against whatever
indoctrination by the educators. In part, this is expressly recognized through the
right of parents to decide upon the philosophical or religious education their
children should be exposed to a right which has been rather extensively
interpreted by, for instance, the European Commission and the European Court
of Human Rights.2 4 But this protective right of parents can only apply as long the
child has not yet come of age in religious and related matters which usually takes
place several years earlier than full majority in the legal sense. Thus, a fourteen or
fifteen year old person normally would not be subject to parental authority in
religious matters anymore, although majority in the legal sense has not yet been
reached. Therefore, the right to education, understood as a right protecting the
individual from indoctrination in educational institutions, must be interpreted as
protecting the individual student having come of age in religious and related
matters, as well. It entitles the bearer of this right to demand from the State in its
supervisory capacity to keep educators under their authority from indoctrinating
the students with their own personal views or beliefs.
This does not mean that educators may not hold their own firm beliefs and value
orientations. But it does mean that they have to make it clear to the young people
under their care that these are their personal, subjective views open to critical
discussion like any other views. What educators at every educational level must be
prohibited from doing is acting as "mouthpieces for constituencies". Whenever
they introduce their own convictions and beliefs, shared with whatever "constituency", into their teaching it must be done in a way which helps the persons under
their care to learn, i. e., "to transcend their original condition" and develop their
personality. Phrased in broader terms, the meaning of the right to education in its
dimension of protecting individual freedom may be summarized in the following
way: education which makes an individual the object of instruction and/or indoctrination instead of the subject of learning is incompatible with human dignity.
On the basis of this conclusion, the full scope and meaning of the right to
education can now be sketched out in the following concluding section.

See, for instance, the Kjeldsen case in which the parents of Danish high school students
challenged the legality of State ordered sex education and the respective curricula; the
European Court of Human Rights rejected the claim of a violation of the parents' right to
determine their children's moral, religious or philosophical education, but made it clear that
the subject introduced into the Court was clearly covered by art. 2 of the Protocol [1];
European Court Reports 23, p. 27, para. 54.
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III. Conclusion: The Right to Education as a Social
and a Liberal Human Right
Based on the concept of human dignity inherent in every human being, the right
to education shows a double nature. It is a "social right" in the sense of the whole
range of so-called "second generation" human rights. As such it entitles every
person to have access to and to receive an adequate education to be provided by the
State. In contrast to the classical notion of human rights which are directed against
undue State interference with the sphere of individual freedom, the right to
education as a "social right" asks for State "involvement", for active State
intervention. But as a right based on human dignity as the ultimate anchor point,
the right to education at the same time is a liberal (classical) human right
protecting individual freedom from infringements at the hands of State authorities
as well as educators as far as such infringements might occur in the process of
education, i. e. by one-sided curricula or ideological indoctrination of whatever
kind.
This double nature of the right to education makes it a rather unique right as
compared with either the classical liberal human rights or the new social rights. As
a right demanding an active role of the State in the provision of the educational
infrastructure, financial resources and the exercise of extensive supervisory powers, it shares the characteristics of all social rights the exercise of which entails a
pervasive State presence in whatever sphere of social life is affected. But on the
other hand, the right to education provides for remedies against the dangers of an
omnipresent State authority. The right to education as a liberal right delineates
the limits of the lawful implementation of the obligations of the State charged to it
by the right to education as a social right. Thus, the misgivings uttered against the
new, the social rights are not justified from a doctrinal point of view in the case of
the right to education.
But the question may be asked whether these doctrinal considerations have any
meaning in practice. Is there any evidence that the right to education is exercised
and implemented in its double nature in real life? The answer is a definite "yes".
There is ample jurisprudence of the courts of many countries, particularly in the
United States and in European countries and of regional human rights bodies such
as the European Commission and the European Court of Human Rights, which
deals with both aspects of the right to education. Courts have uniformly upheld
the right to education as the right protecting students from indoctrinations either
by the State authorities or by educators.

